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1 
The Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy in the Philippines: Securitisation, emerging 
powers and multilateral policies 
Recent geopolitical and economic changes have altered global social policy formation. Bretton 
Woods multilateral development agencies (MDAs) have selectively incorporated ideas that 
have emerged from developing country states and decision makers. Recent years have 
witnessed an increased acceptance of social transfers as part of renewed efforts at poverty 
alleviation policies based on social risk management. There has been an instance in the use and 
promotion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) policies by MDAs. One case is the Philippines. 
CCTs were a product of the emergence of a neostructuralist welfare regime (understood as an 
ideal type) in Latin America. There was an attempt to reconcile neoliberal strategies of 
development with aspirations for guaranteed minimum incomes. The Bretton Woods and 
regional development bank MDAs have facilitated the adoption of CCTs in other developing 
country contexts. In the Philippines, a combination of actions by national political actors and 
MDAs resulted in the implementation of a securitised and compliance-focused version of CCTs 
derived from the Colombian security state. Although poor households welcome income 
assistance, CCTs have acted to enforce further state monitoring without altering the national-
based political and economic processes that replicate poverty.   
Keywords: poverty, social policy, cash transfers; Latin America; Asia; Philippines 
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Introduction 
There have been many recent attempts to create frameworks for social protection in 
developing-country contexts. 1 The suggested policies forms reflect both alterations in the 
relationships between developed and developing economies and the role of international 
organisations. There has been a shift in global social policy (GSP) formation towards a new 
geopolitical economy of social policy (GESP) making.2 Multilateral development agencies 
(MDAs) have both helped facilitate these developments (especially United Nations MDAs) or 
selectively incorporated (Bretton Woods MDAs) ideas that have emerged from developing 
country states. There has been a de facto increased recognition by the latter of direct social 
transfer payments for achieving poverty alleviation goals. One of the most widespread forms 
of social transfer payments are cash transfer and conditional cash transfer (CCT) projects that 
now operate in over thirty countries and cover millions of beneficiaries. CCTs were pioneered 
by some middle-income countries in Latin America - in the late-1990s and early-2000s. They 
entailed targeted cash grants for impoverished households in return for meeting mandatory 
requirements concerning children’s (and parental [mostly mother’s]) attendance at educational 
and health services.3  
These initiatives in Latin America took place in the context of a modest shift in economic 
development policy towards neostructuralism. The term neostructuralism is defined here as 
“the prevailing narrative that has sought to replace “market fundamentalism” and humanise the 
“savage capitalism” imposed by neoliberal dogmatism.” 4 It was one reflection of alterations 
in the global geopolitical economy that led to higher rates of growth for some Latin American 
economies. The partial nature of the shift was reflected in the limited policy changes that 
neostructuralism entailed. The market-based approaches to economic development contained 
in the Washington consensus (WC) remained hegemonic. Neostructuralism endeavoured to 
selectively re-incorporate some of older industrial structuralist policy themes into the WC. The 
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scope of neostructuralism mostly concerned issues of economic growth and industry policy: 
seeking a “high road to globalisation”. Classical structuralism, however, had entailed particular 
approaches to social policy: a “Latin American welfare regime.” The transition from 
structuralism to the high –point of the WC and back again to neostructuralism entailed changes 
to the Latin American welfare regime. After an initial shift towards abandonment due to the 
WC and its associated conservative fiscal policies, there was a subsequent shift back towards 
limited forms of social provision, including social transfers. There was, however, considerable 
variation in their occurrence with different types of programs being established. CCTs have 
been a major part of these newer initiatives, although not all of the programs are the same.  
Moreover, the shift towards limited social protection led to “feedbacks” into international 
development policy making via MDAs. The spread of CCTs has emerged as a major facet of 
developing social protection regimes supported by the World Bank (WB) and other MDAs. 
One example is the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines. It 
commenced operation in 2007 and covered up to three million households by the end of 2013. 
The Philippines provides a vantage point from which to assess why CCT programs were 
adopted. It has been characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality, despite its nominal 
status as a middle-income country. The implementation of 4Ps was one way to redress these 
issues. The form of CCT that was adopted, however, was heavily supported and funded by 
MDAs. It also reflected powerful political pressures and existential threats upon the 
government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2008).  
Moreover, the spread of CCTs demonstrates an alteration in the GSP process towards GESP. 
There are instances, on the one hand, of policy experimentation emerging in some developing 
country contexts. The influence of MDAs, however, mediated the diffusion of similar policies 
in other developing country contexts. The MDA-sponsored approaches have been 
accompanied by a focus on ensuring poor people's compliance and increasing the security of 
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the state through a greater presence in and surveillance of the population. CCTs have become 
components of an increased securitisation of development policy.5 One facet of their operation 
was their use of women as vital conduits for the distribution of funds as the micro-scale. 
Effectively a form of “governance feminism” has combined legitimate concerns for women’s 
empowerment and independence with explicit goals of monitoring household compliance to 
meet funding conditionalities.6 The human-capital forming, gender empowering and poverty 
alleviation focus of CCTs blended with goals of the containment of the existential threats.  
The methods involved range across three spheres. First, a conceptual model is developed that 
combines an analysis of GSP with geopolitical economy. These are combined with a 
comparative historical approach to conceptualising the neostructuralist welfare regime. Second, 
the themes these provide are integrated into the analysis of key policy documents, combined 
with insights from focus groups conducted in Mindanao in 2014. The study outlines how the 
securitisation of social protection policy occurred through the selective diffusion of Latin 
American approaches to social welfare. It uses the case of 4Ps in the Philippines as a case study. 
The hegemony of MDAs, however, has meant that particular forms of CCTs have been adopted 
that emphasise high conditionality and reliance on external finance. This is especially the case 
in the Philippines. Section one examines the evolution of GSP and the emergence of GESP. 
The second section outlines both the Latin American origins and international diffusion of 
CCTs. The third part assesses the experience of the Philippines.  
  
From Global to Geopolitical Economic Social Policy 
The trends towards the adoption of social transfer payments reflect an evolution in the process 
of GSP making. A tempering of the GSP’s focus on “globalisation” is needed that recognises 
the enduring role of nation states and partial changes in international political power. 
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The GSP approach emerged during the peak influence of globalisation centred discourses that 
emphasised the uniformity of neoliberal policymaking. 7  The resulting agency, structure, 
institution and discourse method focused on the main features of the early to mid-2000s. There 
was the continuing hegemony of the WC (augmented by limited governance and social 
protection measures); the competing priorities of different MDAs and donor states; and the 
emergence of transnational social movements and international non-government organisations 
(NGOs).8 Recent reflections by GSP researchers has re-emphasised the impacts of colonialism 
and the role of political actors from within the developing world. 9  Developing-country 
governments played a significant role in creating policy innovations. This included CCTs and 
other facets of social policy in Brazil, for instance.  
One question that emerges is to what degree have established patterns of policy making altered. 
Changes in the geopolitical economy and the impact of so-called “rising developing powers” 
had material and ideational components to consider. The material factors consist, for the most 
part, of an uneven political and economic strengthening of some late industrialising 
economies.10 One facet of the process has been a reiteration the “materiality of the state” in the 
process of uneven and combined development on a global scale. In contrast to some of the 
more exaggerated claims of early 2000s globalisation literature, the capability of the state has 
been central for engendering successful economic development outcomes. The consolidation 
of China as an export market since 2000 has resulted in some positive flow-on of effects for 
many developing economies.11 One has been the emergence of a global commodity price cycle 
that has been advantageous for resource exporting economies.12 Although the resilience of this 
economic expansion is questionable, one medium-term consequence has been the emergence 
of a more stable fiscal environment for some developing states. The resulting economic 
situation allowed for some expansion in investments in social policy measures. Again Brazil is 
a case in point, with revenues from mineral exports allowing for the expansion of social 
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expenditures (see below). Of course, there is considerable unevenness in the extent of the 
weight of the developing country powers and the developed economies remaining dominant.   
There were additional factors. One was the cumulative effects within developing countries of 
class, gender and ethnic-based political mobilisation across the 1990s. Social-movement 
mobilisation produced either pressure upon or new governments committed to implementing 
more extensive social policies. There were different expressions of these processes, ranging 
from the emergence of both left-of-centre or technocratic reforming governments in Latin 
America.13 Second, both United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs themselves had begun to 
debate ways that the WC could be altered to include “social protection” measures, especially 
in the wake of economic crises in the 1990s.14  
GESP also reflected an uneven shift in the ideational dimensions of power that matched the 
material change. The GSP literature tended to emphasise the competing roles of national 
governments, MDAs and international non-government organisations in setting policy 
agendas, while recognising the overall hegemony of neoliberal policy. There was a 
comparative “BRICisation” of policymaking personnel, evident within the Bretton Woods 
MDAs and perhaps most notably the WB.15  These appointments did not comprise substantive 
challenges to the hegemony of the established developed powers over policy-making. 
Developed economy donors, however, were willing to accept personnel and ideas from 
developing country contexts: provided they did not stray too outside ideational limits of what 
Cammack referred to as “global liberalism.” 16  Recent analyses have also identified the 
existence of influential layers of policy makers from the developing world in concerned with 
sectors such as international trade.17 Of course, the perspectives of these experts vary. Some 
are closer to the established WC than others. One emerging facet of policy analysis has 
therefore become detecting the ways international organisations selectively incorporate the 
ideas of developing country policy making experiments. Particular experiences from 
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developing economies tended to get greater influence and promotion over others. In other 
words, the WC remained hegemonic, albeit with selective and ad-hoc adaptation to emerging 
policies of some developing countries.  
Therefore, GSP has evolved towards a GESP process. First, the old institutions (global finance; 
developed country donors; developed-country dominated Bretton Woods MDAs) remain 
dominant. They ultimately allocate resources for programs and have effective veto rights over 
policy-making through both formal control (voting quotas, for example). There is also their 
continued role as the principal donors. Second, developing countries have gathered 
considerable experiences in policy innovation and development. These have been promoted by 
an emerging cadre of development and social policy experts from developing states. One 
source for the dissemination of these policies has been “South-South aid”, although the quantity 
of this remains small in comparison to official bilateral and multilateral flows.18 The social 
policy consequences of China’s aid in Africa, for instance, are unclear.19 Third, the other source 
of dissemination has been through the selective incorporation of both policies and decision 
makers into existing MDAs.  
Indeed, the adoption of CCTs as a mechanism of direct social transfers is very illustrative of 
the GESP process. The dominant MDAs, however, largely determined the interpretation and 
implementation of these experiences were elsewhere.  
Latin American Policies and Internationalisation 
The introduction of social protection systems over the past decade has reflected these newer 
patterns of the GESP. An interaction existed between national-based social reform innovations 
and selected adoption by MDAs. One significant trend was the emergence in Latin America of 
what can arguably be termed a neostructuralist welfare regime.  
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Social Policy: A Neostructuralist Welfare Regime? 
One way of understanding the appearance of CCTs and other similar social protection and 
policy measures is through the concept of the welfare regime. The welfare regime allocates 
different national and regional welfare states into ideal-type categories to describe historical 
experiences.20  
Figure 1 demonstrates a schematic overview of the history of welfare regimes in Latin America. 
A schematic indication is given of the periods of economic development and their associated 
social policies. First, there was a classic “Latin American welfare regime” that emerged in the 
early twentieth century.21  It was the redistributive component of the hegemonic structuralist 
and import-substituting policies of industrialisation and development. Classic structuralism 
reflected the reconciliation of nationalist political and development aspirations with insertion 
within the international division of labour.22 Elites within developing Latin American nation-
states maintained power in part through hegemonic alliances with sections of middle and 
working classes. The resulting welfare regime entailed a predominantly conservative and 
informal policy-mix that emphasised: health and education expenditures; employment 
protection; price controls; and contributory social insurance. Direct social transfer payments 
were rare and high levels of labour market informality effectively limited the coverage of 
contributory schemes.23  
Figure 1: Latin American Welfare Regime: Stages of Transition 
Period Development Strategy Redistributive Strategy Characteristics 
1900-
1980s 
Structuralism/ Import 
Substitution (Protected 
national industry and 
oligarchic governing blocs) 
Conservative-Informal mix Contributory social 
insurance; price controls; 
subsidies 
1980-late 
1990s 
High-point of the WC (Crisis, 
stabilisation, restructuring and 
export-oriented 
industrialisation)  
Retreat and dismantling of 
measures 
Privatisation and wind-
back of state- based 
measures; marketisation.  
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Late 1990s Neo-structuralism (A limited 
break from the WC: ‘High 
road to globalisation’) 
Notional commitment to 
universal social rights combined 
with varying degrees of targeted 
social transfer payments 
Social transfer payments; 
poverty expenditures; 
contributory social 
insurance.  
 
Second, even these conservative-informal measures were eventually curtailed in the aftermath 
of the economic crises of the early 1980s and the dominance of the WC. As the second row 
indicates, the existing welfare policy-mix was attacked for allegedly having “distortionary” 
effects on markets.24 Simultaneously many of the governing regimes in Latin American states 
faced increased political pressures for democratisation and social reform.25 There was - as a 
result – generally considerable conflict between substantial fiscal constraints imposed by the 
WC and demands for greater social protection.  
Third and accordingly, the high phase of WC dominance eventually gave way to some modest 
and incremental changes in policies. At the international scale, there were piecemeal 
modifications, with an increasing focus on institutions, governance and poverty alleviation.26 
Within Latin America, neostructuralism emerged as a policy model. Another synonymous term 
in Latin America was neo-developmentalism, although neostructuralism had a stronger 
association with the explicit positions of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.27 These regional-body sponsored policy proposals attempted to reconcile a limited 
revival of traditional structuralist themes with the WC and its associated focus on the 
disciplinary constraints of international capital.28 The WC, therefore, continued as a hegemonic 
project, although now accompanied by limited interventionist themes of human capital 
development and industrial policy. The social policy innovations that emerged around the same 
time have received less attention. These tried to resurrect and surpass some of the themes of 
the older Latin American welfare regimes within a context of the substantial fiscal constraints. 
One innovation was the greater use of targeted and direct social transfer payments.  
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Therefore, there was a gradual evolution from the WC towards limited acceptance of 
neostructuralist themes. One component of this was arguably the emergence of a 
neostructuralist welfare regime that corresponded with the limited re-introduction of broader 
economic interventionism. This entailed increased acceptance of direct social transfer 
payments such as CCTs.  
Variations in Policy 
Brazil and Colombia are two national case studies that effectively illustrate these differences 
across the general influence of neostructuralism and associated welfare measures. CCTs 
emerged as keystone social policies in both instances.  
First, neostructuralism in Brazil was embedded in a form of cross social class based “coalition 
for economic growth”. The Bolsa Família program is probably the most well-known example 
of a CCT program that became a central policy-reducing measure. It is the program that has 
the least stringent conditionalities and sanctions. The raised expectations generated by labour 
and social movement mobilisations helped drive the process of democratisation and social 
policy reforms. The re-democratising constitution, adopted in 1988, had nominally guaranteed 
social rights to citizens. The predominant focus on fiscal consolidation and adjustment by 
governments before 2002, however, meant few significant new social expenditures occurred.  
However, the constitution’s decentralisation provisions granted more autonomy to sub-national 
state and municipal-level governments to experiment with policies. 29 Such experimentation 
occurred - especially with administrations led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) which 
adopted the first limited programs.30 The election of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as 
President in 2002 resulted in the national consolidation of the existing limited and fragmented 
set of payment programs. These were amalgamated into the Bolsa Família in 2003 and 2004 
11 
under the control of a new Ministry of Social Development. By 2012, Bolsa Família’s coverage 
had extended to 12 million households.  
Bolsa Família’s emergence in Brazil was an explicit expression of a social policy of the 
neostructuralist welfare regime. In the broader economic development sphere, the Lula 
government was somewhat influenced by the “high road to globalisation” and other themes of 
neostructuralism. There was no significant disruption of the previous administrations’ 
emphasis on compliance to global market forces, although a limited revival occurred of 
intervention in industry policy and other areas. 31  Social protection policy, accordingly, 
operated within accepted tight fiscal constraints and with a somewhat targeted set of 
beneficiaries.32  
However, Brazil designed and implemented its policies with considerable autonomy from the 
Bretton Woods MDAs. There was, on the one hand, political pressure from mass social 
movements and the experiences of the sub-national governments. Brazil also experienced 
higher levels of economic growth between 2002 and 2010 than in previous decades. 33 The 
economic expansion was in large part due to the impact of the global commodities price cycle 
and the resulting boom in mineral exports. Government and social expenditures could, 
therefore, expand without affecting capital and higher-income earners. Bolsa Família’s 
coverage could also increase without significant fiscal implications and with minimal financing 
from donors. Brazil’s overall public spending remained steady at around 20.3 percent of GDP 
between 2002 and 2010. 34 The amounts consumed by Bolsa Família were comparatively 
modest. Its annual expenditure of $8 billion in 2010, for instance, was equivalent to 0.6 percent 
of GDP and was financed by domestic taxation revenue. The WB’s total contribution was only 
$500 million in 2004.35  
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The small level of Bretton Woods MDA support had important implications for Bolsa 
Família’s operation. There were significant differences between it and other CCT programs. 
First, there was the much lighter use of conditionalities (as Brazil used self-declared income 
rather than much-promoted proxy means tests). Local municipal bodies did implementation 
and evaluation. As Soures and Silva note: 
The response to any lack of compliance with conditionalities is another feature that 
distances Bolsa Família from a typical CCT. The programme incorporates a system 
of repercusão gradativa (gradual repercussion), (this) is used because the objective 
of the programme is not to punish families but to help them to comply with the 
conditionalities. In fact, the design allows for the waiver of conditionalities in the 
case where this can be justified (e.g. illness of a child, threat of violence at school, 
etc). Social services at municipal level are responsible for the case management of 
non-compliance episodes.36 
Second and accordingly, the comparative priorities within CCT programs between the longer-
term objectives of human resource development and the immediate issue of poverty alleviation 
was resolved in favour the latter.37 Bolsa Família also had other adverse effects, such as 
purportedly reducing political and social mobilisations in favour of redistributive land 
reform.38 There was, however, a high-level of “country-ownership” of the program. Although 
it is uncertain how much is attributable to CCTs, it is clear that poverty levels declined, and 
there was a marginal decrease in income inequality.39 The role of minimum wage standards, 
pension reforms and other labour market measures, complementary to Bolsa Família, were 
clearly also important.  
Colombia’s experience, on the other hand, with its CCT program contrasted significantly with 
Brazil’s use lighter conditionality-based approach with high country ownership. In terms of 
broader economic development policy, the influence of neostructuralism on Colombia was 
remarkably similar to Brazil’s.40 Overall, however, there were notable differences with Brazil, 
such as a highly militarised and conflict-prone society and high levels of MDA intervention. 
There were, as a result, big differences in social policy. The focus of poverty reduction emerged 
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as a response to “existential” threat to the state and elites’ security, and there was an integration 
of the resulting CCT program into counter-insurgency measures. 41 In many ways, Colombia’s 
Familias en Acción emerged as the most “securitised” form of CCT with high levels of MDA 
and foreign support.  
The historical, political and economic context of Colombia consisted of limited democratic 
reforms in the 1990s and fleeting attempts to end several decades of civil conflict. The inclusion 
of nominal social rights in the new 1991 constitution intended to entail an eventual guaranteed 
minimum income for citizens.42 The new constitution’s emphasis on social reform and ending 
the political conflict, however, failed as the political system continued to be exclusionary and 
marked by endemic violence.43 There remained at least two major insurgencies and ongoing 
conflicts over narcotics production.44 The formal political system remained dominated by elite-
driven and ideologically conservative political parties. Colombia’s rate of economic growth 
was also lower than Brazil’s: the average annual growth of GDP per-capita was only one 
percent between 1990 and 2001 and 2.5 percent between 2002 and 2010. Annual government 
expenditures represented just 16 percent of GDP since the late 1990s.45 It was, therefore, a 
poorer economy with more limited fiscal capacity. 
Most significantly, there were much larger-scale armed conflicts in Colombia. Its military 
expenditures averaged 17 percent of central government outlays, compared to just 6.5 percent 
in Brazil throughout the 2000s. The formal statistics on battle deaths averaged 737 per year 
between 1989 and 2009 in Colombia. Brazil, in contrast, had no deaths registered.46 While the 
immediate pretext for the implementation of Familias en Acción was an economic crisis in 
1999, it was also aimed at undermining the basis of armed insurgencies’ support amongst 
sections of the population. The CCT program was, therefore, initiated by Andrés Pastrana 
Arango’s conservative government as part of attempts to create a political settlement with rebel 
groups. These conciliatory policies gave way to the heavily militarised approach of the Plano 
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Colômbia policy (adopted after 2000). The subsequent Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s administration 
extended Plano Colômbia’s operation, and with Familias en Acción integrated within it. 47  
Also, Familias en Acción was almost entirely funded by Bretton Woods MDAs. Colombia’s 
overall official development assistance reliance was higher in comparison to the other two 
cases, with net per capita inflows averaging $16 between 1990 and 2010, compared to just 
$1.45 in Brazil.48 Familias en Acción’s total annual budget of approximately $1 billion had 
resulted in the program’s coverage extending to 1.7 million households by 2007. External 
financing, therefore, comprised 85 percent of overall funding. The Familias en Acción program, 
therefore, involved even heavier intervention by MDAs. 49  The program was subject to 
intensive monitoring and evaluation.  
The use of proxy means tests and similar punitive measures indicated there was substantial 
intervention by program personnel in beneficiaries’ lives. Familias en Acción relied upon a 
rigorous screening process for identifying beneficiaries that and was integrated with 
Colombia’s identity card system. 50  Then there was intensive intervention by program 
personnel in recipient households with community workers monitoring and implementing the 
program. On the whole, there was greater direct involvement by state personnel with 
beneficiaries associated with securitisation of the program. The high levels of militarisation in 
Colombia were, therefore, matched by a social component based on monitoring of poor 
households.  
These two cases in Latin America suggest the emergence of CCTs reflected inter-linked 
processes within the GESP. There was an ideational shift towards the adoption of forms of 
social protection that consisted of (understood as an ideal type) neostructuralist welfare regime. 
The restructuring of many economies after the crises of the 1980s constrained the ability of 
states to expand social expenditures. The eventual way institutions placated demands for 
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greater social protection was through the introduction of heavily targeted programs such as 
CCTs. There was, as with the broader neostructuralist turn in economic development policy, 
considerable variation in these processes. In Brazil, CCTs were pioneered and expanded upon 
by a centre-left political party as a mass system of payments with light conditionalities. The 
Colombian approach reflected conditions of an exclusionary polity and highly militarised civil 
conflict. Colombia’s program was more heavily securitised and supported by the Bretton 
Woods MDAs. There was, therefore, even considerable variation in policy design within the 
overall framework that emphasised the adoption of heavily targeted payments.  
CCTs and the Internationalisation of Social Transfer Payments 
The Bretton Woods MDAs – especially the WB – subsequently played a considerable role in 
promoting CCT programs on an international scale. They now operate in over thirty countries.  
Significant changes to WB policy on social protection underpinned the spread of CCT 
programs. Previously, the WB’s primary approach was embodied in its Social Risk 
Management (SRM) policy framework. The emergence of SRM reflected a broader 
reorientation of WB policy rhetoric towards “poverty reduction” while maintaining the 
principal components of the WC framework.51 There was accumulating evidence of failures to 
reduce income poverty or protect against the impacts of economic crises. A search for suitable 
social “safety net” mechanisms had begun in the 1990s.52 The WB subsequently adopted its 
SRM framework and codified it in the 2000-1 Attacking Poverty World Development Report.53 
SRM placed primary emphasis on contributory social insurance with little role reserved for 
direct social transfer payments. The social policy boundaries of SRM, therefore, reflected 
continuity with the market-oriented WC.   
However, eventually a greater acceptance of social transfer payments emerged that helped to 
facilitate the promotion of CCTs (albeit remaining subsidiary to contributory programs). The 
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WB and other donors became aware of shortfalls in meeting Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) targets in many countries. CCTs became particularly appealing as they notionally 
addressed different “dimensions” of poverty such as income, education and health while 
retaining strict beneficiary targeting.54 One focus became selectively incorporating the minor 
reforms implicit in the neostructuralist welfare regime into systems that were as compatible 
with the WC as possible.  
Donors were willing to fund forms of social transfer payments, such as CCTs (and also some 
non-conditional cash transfer programs), providing they adhered to policy boundaries. Most 
notably, the emerging plans entailed very limited expenditures. The WB’s position was later 
expressed in policy documents such as the “joint communiqué” with the IMF in 2012. The 
document explicitly endorsed the Mexican CCT program (Oportunidades) as the most efficient 
approach to minimum social protection. The scale of social transfers should comprise no more 
than 0.5 percent of GDP. 55  
Taken together, the international emergence of CCTs reflected modest changes in GSP towards 
a GESP-based processes. They reflected the material and ideational interaction between 
emerging developing powers, United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs and donors. First, the 
overall directionality of hegemonic power and interests remained: the WC continued to frame 
strategy and policy. Second, the implementation of the WC had come into conflict, however, 
aspirations for social protection. One consequence was the emergence neostructuralism as a 
slightly altered version of the WC with its associated welfare regime.  The chief outcomes were 
targeted payment systems to assumed slightly different forms. There was, for example, Brazil’s 
low-conditionality based CCT system and Colombia’s higher-conditionality and MDA-
supported approach. Third, these policy experiments were fed back into the Bretton Woods 
MDAs. These assimilated aspects of the CCT experience and promoted their interpretations. 
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Fourth and finally, the Bretton Woods MDAs sponsored similar programs in other national 
contexts from the mid-2000s.  
CCTs: Security, Poverty and Political Crisis in the Philippines 
Indeed, in the Philippines both the influence of MDAs and the government of President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo’s attempts to contain existential threats were the main elements that shaped 
the adoption of CCTs. CCTS became as a key plank in an evolving social protection framework 
and broader social policy. The process of GESP formation, therefore, appeared in the context 
of national-based political crises and Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDA 
policy hegemony. 4Ps’ local-level implementation experiences also reflect this.  
Poverty, Politics and MDA hegemony 
There were four main historical factors that contributed to the political crisis that led to the 
adoption of CCT adoption in the Philippines. These combined with the GESP processes to 
create 4Ps.  
On the one hand, the first historical factor was colonial history and the subsequent United States 
hegemony over the state and policy making. These ensured “Western-inspired” ideas and 
approaches framed development strategies.56 One implication was the early abandonment by 
the Philippines of any residual import-substitution based and limited version of structuralist 
development policies in favour of export production in the early-1960s. The oligopolistic 
structure of land ownership, however, resulted in low rates of capital accumulation and 
economic growth. 57  The failures to implement substantive land reform measures further 
consolidated the socially exclusionary pattern of development. From the 1970s, in particular, 
there was an expansion of MDA-sanctioned borrowing and hegemony. The resulting sovereign 
debt defaults – associated with dollar appreciation and an economic recession - and political 
upheavals of the early 1980s intensified these exclusionary processes. All subsequent 
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governments (beginning with Cory Aquino in 1987), moreover, have complied with MDA-
imposed conditions and reliance on external finance. There were, therefore, some parallels with 
the political environments that allowed for the emergence of neostructuralism in Latin America. 
The Philippines had similar experiences with a post-authoritarian polity and an extended period 
of MDA hegemony. Was less able to adopt policies that made any substantive adaptations to 
the WC.  
Second and accordingly, the low levels of economic growth and resulting high inequality had 
considerable implications. The deep contraction in the economy in the early 1980s – associated 
with the end of the boom in external financing - meant that per capita income did not recover 
to its 1982 level until 2004. The average annual per capita income growth was consistently low, 
averaging 1.5 percent between 1960 and 2010.58 GINI index measures suggest inequality 
remained high, reaching a peak of 46.3 in 1997 and 43 in 2009. The proportion of the 
population experiencing income poverty fell during the 1990s from 40.6 percent in 1994 to a 
low point of 25 percent in 2003. It then increased again to 26.4 and 26.9 percent in 2006 and 
2009.59 There were similar indicators for non-income poverty measures of poverty. 60 
Third, these trends in poverty and development were reflected in the Philippine polity and the 
ideational basis of institutions. The Philippines had notionally-democratic and republican 
institutions introduced by its former colonial power and these operated after the end of the 
Pacific war (except for Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship between 1972 and 1986).61 In some 
ways the Philippines, however, represented a notable instance of superficially “electoral 
democracy”: elite clan interests monopolised state institutional power. 62  There was the 
widespread operation of clan-based political mechanisms that are exclusionary and entail the 
considerable use of violence.63 There was, therefore, a combination of unequal income and 
asset distribution; political institutions mostly controlled by these wealth appropriating elites. 
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Combined with long-term reliance upon MDAs, one consequence was a permanent fiscal crisis 
in the Philippine state that restricted new spending. 64 
Fourth and finally, there were at least two main long-running armed insurgencies. There was 
the Communist Party of the Philippines-aligned New People’s Army. This insurgency 
remained an ongoing source of conflict for the state, despite declining in recent decades. There 
are also separatist movements (mostly in Mindanao). Added to this is ongoing violence and 
disappearances in many localities linked to elite-based political conflict.65 
On the other hand, the immediate context was a profound political crisis whereby poverty 
alleviation policies became even more heavily securitised. The Philippines had begun to 
develop an anti-poverty strategy late in the term of Fidel Ramos’ administration (1993-1998) 
as a complement to its technocratic “Philippines 2000” program of achieving newly 
industrialised country status. These measures were followed by an expansion in clientelist 
expenditures during Joseph Estrada’s short time as President. Estrada traded on his reputation 
as a former movie star and developed a semi-populist pro-poor rhetoric to attract a base of 
support amongst the countries poorer population and as an alternative to Ramos’ technocratic 
discourse. His government quickly became embroiled in series of controversies, and there was 
an acceleration of the conflict in Mindanao with Bangsamoro separatist groups.66 The issues 
of poverty became a central part of political discourse. There remained lingering sympathy for 
the Estrada’s government’s pro-poor (rhetoric rather than real policy) stance amongst poorer 
constituencies. Any subsequent political regime’s viability – all based elite clan alliances - 
would need to take measures to placate them.  
While Arroyo’s government had come into office as a result of a popular uprising against 
Estrada, her government lacked a base of support amongst the countries’ urban and rural poor.67 
The security and survival of the government, therefore, was always faced with countering the 
20 
existential threat posed by indifference/ opposition of the country’s impoverished population, 
armed insurgencies and elite-based opposition groups. Arroyo had already implemented some 
MDA-sponsored social programs in the areas of poverty and participation, although not on a 
scale that would make substantial inroads into these problems.68 The increased level of income 
poverty recorded in 2006 made it clear that additional poverty-alleviation measures were 
needed. The Philippines’ performance in millennium development goal targets, such as primary 
education and maternal health, was also failing. 69  Other factors would also make the 
introduction of CCTs more urgent.  
Indeed, the Arroyo regime became increasingly embroiled in various controversies over 
electoral irregularities, corruption and violence. These added a sense of panic in the 
administration and predilection for taking any measures necessary for survival. 70 In 2005 
revelations emerged of Arroyo’s large-scale cheating in the 2004 Presidential election. Many 
of the reformers within the government responsible for social policy development resigned. 
The government survived threats from mass political protests and military rebellion. A cascade 
of further crises also occurred over economic cooperation projects with China.71 The regime 
hung on to power, however, despite record negative approval ratings for Arroyo.72  
The deepening political crises (and related pressure to address stagnating levels of poverty and 
human development) provided the context for the influence of the newer GESP. The WB and 
other MDAs had played already played a central part in the design and operation of community-
driven development projects in the Philippines. These also exhibited some evidence of selective 
incorporation of ideas from Latin American contexts.73 In the case of CCTs, MDA support 
resulted in leading staff from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) 
attending the WB’s Istanbul conference on CCTs in 2006. 74  These key personnel then 
formulated a proposal that went to Arroyo’s cabinet in March 2007. Arroyo became 
enthusiastic about the program, especially given the political pressure the regime faced. Her 
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economics training also purportedly made her enthusiastic about the human resource 
development component of the CCTs. The result was the implementation of a pilot program 
for 6000 beneficiary households in two provinces in 2007. Coverage expanded to 320000 
households in 2008. Bilateral and Bretton Woods MDA donors increased support providing 
evaluation and technical feasibility assistance to expand 4Ps to one million households starting 
from 2009.75  
In the meantime, Arroyo’s presidential term ended after the election of Benigno Aquino in 
2010. While he was the son of former President Corazon Aquino and part of an established 
political clan, his campaign nevertheless presented a moderate program of political and social 
reform. An important section of non-government organisation (NGO) activists and Akbayan 
(a left-of-centre political party) supported his presidential campaign. It was organised 
according to both conventional Liberal party (LP) and non-conventional (non-LP) 
components. 76  Aquino’s manifesto – the Contract with the Filipino People – primarily 
emphasised governance and anti-corruption measures. There was very brief mention of poverty 
and the need for “well-considered programs that build capacity and create opportunity among 
the poor and the marginalised…”77 Aquino appointed some activists both from Akbayan and 
development NGOs to his cabinet after the election, including Corazon Solomon as Secretary 
of the DSWD. Soliman had previously been head of DSWD in the early part of the Arroyo 
administration.78  
“Well-considered” or not, the Aquino administration inherited Arroyo’s poverty alleviation 
policies. The already established infrastructure of 4Ps largely ensured that it became the 
centrepiece program. Tatsulo became an overall poverty reduction framework. It encompassed 
4Ps and two other livelihood and community-driven development programs.79 The largest 
component, however, was 4Ps. It continued to expand the number of recipients to one million, 
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and subsequently a third phase of expansion was established. It was, notably, the “reformers” 
within the government that would take on the implementation of the program.  
At this point, Bretton Woods MDA mediation again occurred within the process of GSP/ GESP 
development. The Arroyo government and the main 4Ps MDA donors had already chosen 
Colombia’s Familias en Acción program as the model for 4Ps. Neither Aquino nor his cabinet 
altered this fundamental decision. The DSWD staff had previously mainly studied Mexico’s 
Oportunidades as the chief example of CCT operation - through the WB-sponsored National 
Sector Support for Social Welfare and Development Project.80 The central mechanism for the 
promotion of Familias en Acción was the recruitment of a Colombian consultant - Tarsicio 
Castañeda - as the DSWD’s primary advisor. The WB and the Australian Agency for 
International Development funded the consultancy. 81  The central ideational influences, 
therefore, reflected the interests of major donors and the key personnel that they would favour.  
Amongst the various national approaches of the Latin America neostructuralist welfare regime, 
the donors (along with Arroyo and later Aquino) supported the program with higher 
conditionalities and level of securitisation.  
From Colombia to the Philippines 
The selection of the Colombian consultant and Familias en Acción as a model had three 
important implications for 4P’s implementation. These were readily apparent both in focus 
groups of beneficiaries conducted in Mindanao during 2004 and from examining of the scale 
of social expenditures in the Philippines. 
First, it cemented the ideational hold of SRM on poverty alleviation policy making in the 
Philippines. Castañeda had been a promoter of Chile’s Pinochet-era contributory social 
insurance programs as a model for social safety-nets. These policies were an instance of the 
original (informal-conservative) Latin American welfare regime, but which operated with 
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comparative success in coverage and outcomes.82 In keeping with the evolution of SRM, 
however, Castañeda and other WB-linked policy specialists developed a greater acceptance of 
direct social transfer payments. In keeping with SRM, however, these remain strictly residual 
to contributory social insurance (this is the case with Colombia’s programs). 83  In the 
Philippines, both 4Ps and the broader Tatsulo programs were designed to be residual to 
contributory social insurance schemes. The latter mainly included: the Social Security System; 
Government Service Insurance System; and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation 
(PhilHealth). Their coverage, however, has been and remains limited, extending to only 22 
percent of the population.84 Even with over one million households included in 4Ps (which 
included access to subsidised PhilHealth benefits since 2012), over half of the population was 
not covered by either a transfer payments or contributory programs.  
Comments of beneficiaries in Mindanao reflect these trends . Most of the focus group 
participants (FGP) in Mindanao were beneficiaries who were either single parents or their 
husbands were unreliable or unemployed. The overwhelming response was that while the 
payments were welcome, the small amounts provided only limited relief from income poverty. 
Limits on the months with payments compounded the sense of how small the amount were. 
They only covered ten months of the year. To make matters worse, some payments were said 
to be missing which was distressing in the lead up to Christmas new year. Other FGRs 
emphasised that it was the PhilHealth benefits that were most valuable as these made medicines 
much cheaper. 
Second and accordingly, the emphasis was placed on the strict targeting of payments and 
enforcement of conditionalities. There was a considerable expansion in the numbers of DSWD 
staff and operations for administering the 4Ps program. 85  These DSWD field personnel 
implement an elaborate procedure of targeting and identifying recipient households in eligible 
localities. There is a complex process of targeting and administering the grants, despite the 
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relatively small amounts being dispersed to each household. A household with three qualified 
children receives a subsidy of 1400 pesos ($ 33) a month during the school year or 15000 pesos 
($355) annually as long as they comply with the conditionalities. The process comprises eight 
steps for appraising the potential beneficiaries. The primary factor was the application of 
Colombia’s proxy means test system to the Philippine.86 The identification occurred off the 
poorest households in the selected municipalities through the development of a National 
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTSPR) system. The first implication 
of the NHTSPR is that there are questions about the desirability of the details of Colombian 
test in the Philippine context. There are different patterns and preferences of consumption in 
the Philippines. While notionally aimed at identifying the presence of household items of 
consumption, the proxy means test also entails surveillance. The use of the evaluation tool 
meshes with an overall approach geared towards bringing more involvement by DSWD staff 
in poor households.  
Moreover, an elaborate set of processes is undertaken by DSWD staff at the local scale aimed 
at eliminating any potentially ineligible village members. The culmination is a community 
assembly where “shame” is frequently used to discourage ineligible salaried households from 
pursuing payments. Following further identity checks, a recipient household representative 
agrees to sign a paternalist “oath of commitment”. Amounts are dispersed every two months 
after around processing. The main conditionalities involve: ensuring school attendance; 
undergoing frequent maternal health checks; and attendance at “family” training sessions. The 
implementers concede that the bulk of responsibilities in these areas fall upon mothers and 
female household members. The sanctions for non-compliance are similar to Colombia’s and 
contrast with the lighter conditions imposed by Bolsa Família.  
There was a certain amount of "sideways" glances by the FGP when the issues of selection and 
processes were raised. The main issue was the DSWD staff and their perceived lack of 
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knowledge. This made it easier for local authorities to distort the allocation process in favour 
of clients. The process was not, therefore, immune from local elite manipulation. In one 
instance the process was handed over to a local NGO to administer due to complaints. The 
heavy focus on DSWD staff did not seem to reflect a concern for quality. In fact, they were 
often seen as in league with political and security elites and sometimes engaged in corruption. 
Third, possibly the main aspect of the influence of the Colombian approach – already alluded 
to above in the discussion of proxy means tests - is the degree of everyday intervention in poor 
household’s lives that was involved in 4Ps. This was a facet of securitisation via increasing the 
presence of the state – in the form of DSWD staff - in the everyday lives of the impoverished 
population. The Colombian model is unique in comparison to others in the way that social and 
community workers intervene in households to negotiate and enforce health and education 
targets. Although no association is explicitly made, there is a plausible connection between the 
Colombian security state and the role of staff in regulating poor communities’ access to the 
program. One of the implicit functions of Familias en Acción was to play a de facto role of 
surveillance and provide services and funds to disincentive support or involvement in 
insurgencies. There are similar facets to this in the Philippines. There is a strong focus on 
making the presence of state agencies apparent in marginal and poorer communities. The 
targeting of particular communities coincides with the presence and activity of the two main 
insurgencies, especially in Mindanao in the country’s south. There is an ongoing role for 
DSWD staff within communities where they conduct family-development seminars and other 
programs and monitoring tasks. All of these increase the presence of the state in affected 
communities. 
FGP regarded the family seminars as somewhat useful but lacking a depth of understanding of 
household difficulties. One participant commented that the lessons did not actually offer 
26 
solutions and instead re-enforced a sense that it was up to beneficiaries to take measures to 
escape policy.  Nobody particularly like signing the paternalistic "pledge" statements. 
The FGPs were reluctant to speak on issues of safety and security at first. It was whispered, 
however, that one of the effects of payments was restrictions on movements. It was not possible 
to reside in rebel-controlled areas and receive the payments. The municipality was on the 
outskirts of a medium-sized urban settlement and had a strong security presence (although they 
complained it not enough to deter crime). 
More broadly, the modelling of 4Ps on Colombia’s approach reflected the extent of MDA 
support for and resulted in influence over the design of the program. As outlined above, 
Colombia’s program was also the most heavily reliant on MDA support. The Philippine state 
had nominally limited fiscal capacity to implement a direct social transfer payments system. 
There have historically been chronic problems of low taxation compliance and revenue 
collection by the Philippine state. In part, this is a reflection of the exclusionary polity described 
in above. The primary approach taken by various governments was, as a result, continual 
increases in indirect taxation. One of the main consequences has been that taxation revenue 
averaged just 12.6 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. Government expenditures 
(excluding interest payments) averaged 9.9 percent of GDP in the same period.87  
However, the arbitrary nature of many existing social spending complicated matters further. 
The recent controversy of misuse of Priority Development Assistance Funds (PDAFs) has 
resulted in increased attention to these issues. Philippine Congress members acquired 
considerable discretionary power on (PDAF) expenditures, which became popularly referred 
to as the central “pork barrel”. Although intended to support local infrastructure and relief 
efforts, they have widely become the primary source of clientelist payments.88 A scandal over 
allocations resulted in the Philippine Supreme Court declared the entire PDAF process 
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unconstitutional in November 2013.89 One issue of debate is to the extent that these allocations 
are convertible into more non-discriminatory payments.  
However, the low-level and arbitrary distribution of social expenditures of the Philippines, 
meant that the 4Ps program relied on extensive donor contributions. These came from regional 
development bank and Bretton Woods MDAs over its initial five-year period of operation. The 
degree of this support was outlined by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The total cost of 
the program (including the targeting system and payments) was $1.2 billion: of which $737.8 
million (63 percent) was sourced from the ADB and the WB. 90 Overall social protection 
(including social insurance) grew significantly – between 2005 and 2010 – from a base of 1.6 
to 2.6 percent of GDP. Within this, social assistance increased rapidly from 0.2 to 1.2 percent 
of GDP. Some two-thirds of this expansion, however, was provided by external financing. The 
ADB argued the Philippine government would be able to sustain this level of expenditure at 
around 2.6 percent of GDP in the longer-term. Overall this level of social spending was still 
small comparison to other states – Vietnam’s spending is 4.3 percent, and the average for Latin 
America is 5.1 percent of GDP.91 The program, therefore, remained based on a residual model 
of social protection based on low levels of public expenditure.  
There was an awareness of these issues and their implications amongst some government 
figures within the Philippines. They gave an indication of the “thinking” within the 
administration and the House of Representatives. The former Secretary of Economic and Social 
Planning - Cayetano Paderanga - suggested there were two views. The predominant view was 
that the 4Ps project had a strict five-year lifespan in line with external funding. The less 
prevalent view – that Paderanga held – was that some level of social transfers would need to 
be ongoing for sustained reductions in income poverty to occur. There were, therefore, two 
barriers to establishing ongoing system of payments: one was the expiry of the “catalyst” 
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external financing. The other was the apparent uncertain political commitment to – or even 
comprehension of the need for – an ongoing system of social transfer payments. 
In sum, the Philippine government and its main MDA and bilateral donors opted for an 
approach that derived from and was heavily influenced by Colombia’s CCT program. Both the 
original decision to implement CCTs and the programs design was shaped by the existential 
crisis facing the Arroyo government. The moderately reformist Aquino governments took no 
drastic steps to alter the design. As a result 4Ps has remained a social transfer payment system 
consistent with SRM. There is high-level interventionism in local communities that centred on 
the implementation of proxy means tests and use of state personnel to target and monitor 
beneficiaries. 
The Philippines and the Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy 
In conclusion, the adoption of CCTs in the Philippines provides insight into the ways GSP has 
evolved towards GESP. The change has impacted on the implementation of social protection 
policies. Across the 2000s, there was an emergence of higher levels of economic growth and 
political aspirations for social inclusion in some middle-income economies (rising developing 
powers). One result was an increased space for social policy development. The diffusion of 
these policy innovations to other developing country contexts remained heavily circumscribed 
by the Bretton Woods MDAs.  
The emergence and dissemination of CCTs reflected these processes in five ways. First, there 
was the appearance of what was arguably a neostructuralist welfare regime in Latin America. 
The structuralist approach to development and associated Latin American welfare system 
declined in the 1980s. These changes came increasingly into conflict with aspirations for 
poverty reduction and guaranteed minimum income policies. The somewhat favourable global 
economic conditions of the 2000s provided a context for the limited implementation attempts 
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to overcome these contradictions. There was the emergence of a general neostructuralist policy 
turn or sensibility in some Latin American nation-states. There had also been the inclusion of 
social rights within the new constitutions adopted in democratisation processes or attempts in 
places such as Brazil and Colombia. Neostructuralism selectively incorporated older 
structuralist themes within a development strategy that remained based broadly on the WC. 
Targeted social transfer payments emerged as an important social welfare complement to these 
broader economic development policies.  
Second and accordingly, CCTs were one of most widely adopted social transfer payment 
systems entailed by the neostructuralist regime. The design of CCTs reflected the recognition 
of linkages between inter-generational human capital deficits and poverty levels as a source of 
market failure. These programs sought to address these shortcomings by providing conditional 
payments for children’s school and health service attendance to disincentive the employment 
of child labour. The payments would be heavily targeted and constrained by conditions 
ensuring compliance by poor households. There were, however, differences in the extent of 
coverage, the requirements and their enforcement: with Brazil’s program being much lower 
than Colombia’s.   
Third, the GESP had a considerable impact on the promotion of these policies elsewhere. On 
the one hand, the fragmented attempts to create a safety net in the 1990s eventually coalesced 
into a loose international effort to build “national social protection floors”. MDAs such as the 
WB adapted their existing SRM framework to incorporate a greater role for direct social 
transfers. The considerable shortfalls in many states in meeting poverty-reduction targets 
increased pressure for financing of direct social transfers. CCTs were attractive as they 
addressed three areas of income poverty, education and health. They were increasingly 
promoted from the mid-2000s, although as a residual component subordinated to an emphasis 
on contributory social insurance. The examples of MDA-supported and financed CCT 
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programs tended to accentuate the higher levels of conditionality already contained in 
Colombia’s program. In the case of Colombia, the targeting and compliance regimes entailed 
high levels of intervention and surveillance of poor households.  
On the other hand, national governments (such as the Philippines) that faced real or perceived 
existential threats came to view social transfer payment programs favourably.  CCT programs, 
in particular, attempted to engender consent amongst and placate political demands from poor 
populations. The emphases of the CCT program in Colombia, however, were integrated into 
the processes of the security state and counter-insurgency efforts. It became the case in the 
Philippines. The establishment of 4Ps was as a response to the Arroyo government's 
unpopularity amongst the country’s poor in 2007. The pattern of targeting and enforcement 
were modelled on Colombia’s approach. The Philippine program has expanded rapidly after 
2009. However, the geographical and social targeting of the program was heavily centred on 
areas that viewed as security threats, especially the southern region of the Philippines. The 
targeting and administration of the program focused on increasing the presence of state 
agencies in poorer communities through village assemblies and family development programs.  
Overall the Philippine example suggests, therefore, that the forms of social programs that have 
emerged in many developing countries are being adopted and promoted in particular ways by 
MDAs. They retain a focus on social transfers that are residual. There is a focus on targeting 
and enforcing conditions of poorer communities that focused on security concerns. They are 
often poorly integrated within broader frameworks that exist in places such as Brazil that focus 
on more general aspects of vulnerability and poverty. Policy-makers concerned with the 
implementation of social protection measures could perhaps be more mindful of the negative 
features of MDA measures and the adverse impacts they can have on poor populations and 
broader processes of political and economic change.  
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